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Abstract—
The use of open-source software (OSS) is ever-increasing, and
so is the number of open-source vulnerabilities being discovered
and publicly disclosed. The gains obtained from the reuse of
community-developed libraries may be offset by the cost of timely
detecting, assessing, and mitigating their vulnerabilities.
In this paper we present a novel method to detect, assess
and mitigate OSS vulnerabilities that improves on state-of-the-
art approaches, which commonly depend on metadata to identify
vulnerable OSS dependencies. Our solution instead is code-
centric and combines static and dynamic analysis to determine
the reachability of the vulnerable portion of libraries used
(directly or transitively) by an application. Taking this usage
into account, our approach then supports developers in choosing
among the existing non-vulnerable library versions.
Vulas, the tool implementing our code-centric and usage-based
approach, is officially recommended by SAP to scan its Java
software, and has been successfully used to perform more than
250000 scans of about 500 applications since December 2016. We
report on our experience and on the lessons we learned when
maturing the tool from a research prototype to an industrial-
grade solution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Open-source software (OSS) libraries are widely used in
the software industry: by some estimates, as much as 80%
to 90% of the software products on the market include some
OSS component [1], and each of them contains, on average,
100 distinct open source components, whose code weighs as
much as 35% of the overall application size [2]. The same
study reports that for applications developed for internal use,
the proportion is as high as 75%.
At the same time, the number of vulnerabilities disclosed
for OSS libraries has been steadily increasing since 2009 [1].
While using OSS components with known vulnerabilities is
included in the OWASP Top 10 Application Security Risks
since 2013 [3], [4], still today the problem is far from being
solved. On the contrary, OSS vulnerabilities have been hitting
the headlines of mainstream media many times over the past
few years [5], [6]. As reported by [7], OSS vulnerabilities
were the root cause of the majority of the data breaches
that happened in 2016. In 2017, the Equifax incident [8],
caused by a missed update of a widely used OSS component,
compromised the personal data of over 140 millions of U.S.
citizens.
Establishing effective OSS vulnerability management prac-
tices, supported by adequate tools, is broadly understood as a
priority in the software industry, and tools helping to detect
known vulnerable libraries are available nowadays, either as
OSS or as commercial products (e.g., [9], [10]).
These tools differ in terms of detection capabilities, but (to
the best of our knowledge) the approaches they use rely on
the assumption that the metadata associated to OSS libraries
(e.g., name, version), and to vulnerability descriptions (e.g.,
technical details, list of affected components) are always avail-
able and accurate. Unfortunately, these metadata, which are
used to map each library onto a list of known vulnerabilities
that affect it, are often incomplete, inconsistent, or missing
altogether. Therefore, the tools that rely on them may fail to
detect vulnerabilities (false negatives), or they may report as
vulnerable artifacts that do not contain the code that is the
actual cause of the vulnerability (false positives).
Furthermore, merely detecting the inclusion of vulnerable
libraries does not cater for the needs of the entire software
development life-cycle. In the early phases of development,
updating a library to a more recent release is relatively unprob-
lematic, because the necessary adaptations in the application
code can be performed as part of the normal development
activities. On the other hand, as soon as a project gets closer
to the date of release to customers, and during the entire
operational lifetime, all updates need to be carefully pondered,
because they can impact the release schedule, require addi-
tional effort, cause system downtime, or introduce new defects.
To evaluate precisely the need and the urgency of a library
update, it is necessary to answer the key question: “is the
vulnerability exploitable, given the particular way the library
is used within the application?”. Answering this question is
extremely difficult: vulnerabilities are typically described in
advisories that consist of short, high-level, textual descriptions
in natural language, whereas a reliable assessment of the ex-
ploitability and the potential impact of a vulnerability demands
much lower-level, detailed, technical information.
Our previous work already goes beyond the simple detection
of OSS vulnerabilities: the approach we proposed in [11]
analyzes the code changes introduced by security fixes, and
uses dynamic analysis to assess the impact of the vulnerability
for a given application.
In this paper we build on [11], proposing a code-centric and
usage-based approach to detect, analyze, and mitigate OSS
vulnerabilities: A) We generalize the vulnerability detection
approach of [11] by considering fixes independently of the
vulnerable libraries; B) We use static analysis to determine
whether vulnerable code is reachable and through which call
paths; C) We combine static and dynamic analysis to overcome
their mutual limitations; D) We define metrics which support
the choice of alternative library versions that are not vulner-
able, highlighting which options are more likely to minimize
the update effort and the risk of incompatibility.
Our approach is implemented as a tool, Vulas, which is
adopted at SAP as the officially recommended solution to scan
Java software. The tool has been successfully used to scan
about 500 applications. Vulnerable code was found reachable
for 131 of them and we found that in 7.9% of the cases this
was only determined by the combination of static and dynamic
analysis. We report on our experience and on the lessons we
learned when maturing Vulas from a research prototype to an
industrial-grade solution that has been used to perform over
250000 scans since December 2016.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II describes the technical approach, Section III defines
the update metrics, and Section IV illustrates our approach in
practice. In Section V, we report on our experience, lessons
learned and the challenges we identified. Section VI discusses
related literature and Section VII concludes the paper.
II. TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE APPROACH
In [11] we already presented the idea of shifting the problem
of establishing whether an application is exploitable because
of a known vulnerability in an OSS library, to the problem of
assessing whether the vulnerable code is reachable.
Sections II-A, II-B, and II-C generalize [11], whereas
Sections II-D,II-E extend it with unique novel contributions,
that are the basis of the update metrics presented in Section III.
A. Background
The core of [11] lies on the assumption that a vulnerability
can be detected and analyzed considering the set of program
constructs (such as methods), that were modified, added, or
deleted to fix that vulnerability.
We define a program construct (or simply construct) as
a structural element of the source code characterized by a
type (e.g., package, class, constructor, method), a language (e.g.,
Java, Python), and a unique identifier (e.g., the fully-qualified
name1).
Changes to program constructs are done by means of
commits to a source code repository. The set of changes that
fix a vulnerability can be obtained from the analysis of the
corresponding commit, the fix commit2. We define a construct
change as the tuple
(c, t, AST
(c)
f , AST
(c)
v )
where c is a construct, t is a change operation (i.e., addition,
deletion or modification) on the construct c, and AST(c)f , AST
(c)
v
are, respectively, the abstract syntax trees of c at commit
n and at commit n − 1, i.e., the AST of the fixed and
vulnerable construct. Notice that for deleted (added) constructs
only AST(c)v (AST
(c)
f ) exists.
1As an example, foo.Bar.baz(int) is the fully-qualified name of method
baz(int) in class Bar and package foo.
2In case a commit includes not only a vulnerability fix but also unrelated
changes, then a post-processing of the construct changes is required.
Fig. 1: Vulnerability detection
When a fix is implemented over multiple commits, we rely
on commit timestamps to compute the set of changes by
comparing the source code of the first and the last commit.
If the vulnerability fix includes changes in a nested construct
(e.g., a method of a class), two distinct entries are included in
the set of construct changes, one for the outer construct (the
class), one for the nested construct (the method).
The fix commits of a vulnerability are not always commu-
nicated with its disclosure. Some OSS projects (e.g., Apache
Tomcat) provide such information via security advisories; oth-
ers reference issue tracking systems which in turn describe
the vulnerability being solved; some other OSS projects
do not explicitly refer to vulnerabilities being fixed. Thus
reconciling the information based on the textual description
and code changes requires considerable manual effort (see
Section V-B3). A broader discussion of the data integration
problem can be found in [11].
Differently from [11], we provide a definition of construct
change and consider the ASTs of the modified program
constructs. This is used in Section II-B to establish whether
libraries include the changes introduced by the fix.
B. Vulnerability Detection
Figure 1 illustrates how a vulnerability j is associated to
an application a. Cj is the set of the constructs obtained as
described above by analyzing the fix commits of j. The set Si
is the set of all constructs of the OSS library i bundled in the
application a whereas Sa is the set of all constructs belonging
to the application itself.
If Cj ∩ Si 6= ∅ and ∀c ∈ Cj ∩ Si, AST(c) = AST(c)v , then we
conclude that the application includes a library i with code
vulnerable to j (referred to as vulnerable constructs), i.e.,
constructs that have been changed in the fix commits of j.
If ∃ c ∈ Cj ∩ Si | AST(c) 6= AST(c)v , then we relax the
equality constraint and use both AST(c)v and AST
(c)
f to establish
to which of the two AST(c) is “closest”. To this end, we use tree
differencing algorithms [12], [13] and a library comparison
method that we devised (whose description is omitted from
this paper because of space constraints). Manual inspection
is still required whenever no automated conclusion can be
taken, e.g., when ∃ c1, c2 ∈ Cj ∩ Si | AST(c1) = AST(c1)v
and AST(c2) = AST(c2)f .
Note that, even when a vulnerability is fixed by adding
new methods to an existing class, the intersection Cj ∩ Si
is not empty because, as explained in the previous section, it
would contain the construct for the class. If the fix includes the
addition of a class, we assume that existing code is modified
to invoke the new construct.
Differently from [11], we define the set of constructs Cj as
independent of any library i, and a vulnerability in a library is
then detected through the intersection of its constructs with
Cj . This approach has several advantages: First, it makes
it explicit that the vulnerable constructs responsible for a
vulnerability j can be contained in any library i, hence, the
approach is robust against the prominent practice of repack-
aging the code of OSS libraries. Second, it is sufficient that a
library includes a subset of the vulnerable constructs for the
vulnerability to be detected. Last, it improves the accuracy
compared to approaches based on metadata, which typically
flag entire open-source projects as affected, even if projects
release functionalities as part of different libraries. Apache
POI [14], for instance, is developed within a single source
code repository but released as multiple libraries, each offering
functionalities for manipulating different types of Microsoft
Office documents.
Moreover, in [11] we focused on newly-disclosed open-
source vulnerabilities, and thus could assume that, at the time
of disclosure, every library that includes constructs changed in
the fix commit is vulnerable. While the assumption holds at
that moment in time, it is not valid for old vulnerabilities. In
this case, one has to establish whether a given library contains
the fixed code, which we support by comparing the AST of
constructs in use with those of the affected and fixed construct
versions.
C. Dynamic Assessment of Vulnerable Code
After having determined that an application depends on
a library that includes vulnerable constructs, it is important
to establish whether these constructs are reachable. In this
paper, we use the term reachable to denote both the case
where dynamic analysis shows that a construct is actually
executed and the case where static analysis shows potential
execution paths. The underlying idea is that if an application
executes (or may execute) vulnerable constructs, there exists
a significant risk that the vulnerability can be exploited. The
dynamic assessment described here is borrowed from [11].
Figure 2a illustrates the use of dynamic analysis to assess
whether the vulnerable constructs are reachable by observing
actual executions. Tai represents the set of constructs, either
part of application a or its bundled library i, that were executed
at least once during some execution of the application. The
collection of actual executions of constructs can be done at
different times: during unit tests, integration tests, and even
during live system operation (if possible). The intersection
Cj∩Tai comprises all those constructs that are both changed in
the fix commits of j and executed in the context of application
a because of its use of library i.
(a) Dynamic
(b) Static
(c) Combination of static and dynamic
Fig. 2: Vulnerability analysis
D. Static Assessment of Vulnerable Code
In addition to the analysis of actual executions (dynamic
analysis), our approach uses static analysis to determine
whether the vulnerable constructs are potentially executable.
Specifically, we use static analysis in two different flavors.
First, we use it to complement the results of the dynamic
analysis, by identifying the library constructs reachable from
the application. Second, (Section II-E) we combine the two
techniques by using the results of the dynamic analysis as
input for the static analysis, thereby overcoming limitations
of both techniques: static analyzers are known to struggle
with dynamic code (such as, in Java, code loaded through
reflection [15]); on the other hand, dynamic (test-based) meth-
ods suffer from inadequate coverage of the possible execution
paths.
Figure 2b illustrates how we use static analysis to comple-
ment the results of dynamic analysis. Rai represents the set of
all constructs, either part of application a or its bundled library
i, that are found reachable starting from the application a and
thus can be potentially executed. Static analysis is performed
by using a static analyzer (e.g., [16]) to compute a graph of
all library constructs reachable from the application constructs.
The intersection Cj ∩ Rai comprises all constructs that are
both changed in the fix commit of j and can be potentially
executed.
E. Combination of Dynamic and Static Assessment
Figure 2c illustrates how we combine static and dynamic
analysis. In this case the set of constructs actually executed,
Tai, is used as starting point for the static analysis. The
Fig. 3: Vulnerability analysis example
result is the set RTai of constructs reachable starting from the
ones executed during the dynamic analysis. The intersection
Cj ∩ RTai comprises all constructs that are both changed in
the fix commit of j and can be potentially executed.
We explain the benefits of the combinations of the two
techniques through the example in Figure 3.
In the following, we denote a library bundled within a
software program with the term dependency. Let Sa be a
Java application having two direct dependencies S1 and Sf
where S1 has a direct dependency S2 that in turn has a direct
dependency S3 (thereby S2 and S3 are transitive dependencies
for the application Sa). S1 is a library offering a set of
functionalities to be used by the application (e.g., Apache
Commons FileUpload [17]). Moreover the construct γ of S1
calls the construct δ of S2 dynamically, e.g., by using Java
reflection, which means the construct to be called is not known
at compile time. Sf is what we call a “framework” providing a
skeleton whose functionalities are meant to call the application
defining the specific operations (e.g., Apache Struts [18],
Spring Framework [19]). The key difference is the so-called
inversion of control as frameworks call the application instead
of the other way round.
With the vulnerability detection step of Section II-B, our
approach determines that Sa includes vulnerable constructs
for vulnerabilities j1 and j2 via the dependencies Sf and S3,
respectively. Note that even if S3 only contains two out of the
three constructs of Cj2 , our approach is still able to detect the
vulnerability.
We start the vulnerability analysis by running the static
analysis of Section II-D that looks for all constructs potentially
reachable from the constructs of Sa. The result is the set Ra1
including all constructs of Sa and all constructs of S1 reach-
able from Sa. As expected, Sf is not reachable in this case
as frameworks are not called by the application. Moreover,
it is well known that static analysis cannot always identify
dynamic calls like those performed using Java reflection. As
the call from γ to δ uses Java reflection, in this example only
S1 is statically reachable from the application. As shown in
Figure 3 Ra1 does not intersect with any of the vulnerable
constructs.
The dynamic analysis of Figure 2a produces the set Ta
(omitted from the figure) of constructs that are actually ex-
ecuted. Though no intersection with the vulnerable constructs
is found, the dynamic analysis increases the set of reachable
constructs (Ra1∪Ta in Figure 3). In particular it complements
static analysis revealing paths that static analysis missed. First,
it contains construct  of framework Sf that calls construct
α of the application. Second, it follows the dynamic call
from γ to δ.
Combining static and dynamic analysis, as shown in Fig-
ure 2c, we can use static analysis with the constructs in Ta as
starting point. The result is the set RTa (omitted in the figure)
of all constructs that can be potentially executed starting from
those actually executed Ta.
After running all the analyses, we obtain the overall set
Ra1 ∪ Ta ∪ RTa (shown with solid fill in Figure 3) of all
constructs found reachable by at least one technique. Its
intersection with Cj1 and Cj2 reveals that both vulnerabilities
j1 and j2 are reachable, since one vulnerable construct for
each of them is found in the intersection and is thus reachable
(η ∈ Cj1 is reachable from  and ω ∈ Cj2 is reachable from δ).
III. VULNERABILITY MITIGATION
The analysis presented in Sections II-C to II-E provides
in-depth information about the control-flow between the code
of the application and its dependencies. In the following, this
information is leveraged to support application developers in
mitigating vulnerable dependencies.
As long as non-vulnerable library versions are available,
updating to one of those is the preferred solution to fix
vulnerable application dependencies. And since the approach
described in Section II-A depends on the presence of at least
one fix commit, a non-vulnerable library version becomes
available when the respective open-source project releases a
version including this commit. However, it is well known that
developers are reluctant to update dependencies because of the
risk of breaking changes, the difficulties in understanding the
implications of changes, and the overall migration effort [20],
[21]. Such risk and effort depend on the usage the application
makes of the library, and on the amount of changes between
the library version currently in use and the respective non-
vulnerable version. As a result of the analysis described in
Sections II-C to II-E, the reachable share of each library is
known. Whether a construct with a given identifier is also
available in other versions of a library can always be deter-
mined, for instance, by comparing compiled code with tools
such as Dependency Finder [22]. Among all the reachable
constructs, of particular importance in the scope of mitigation
are those which are called directly from the application, as
they provide a measure of how many times the application
developer explicitly used the library. We define a touch point as
a pair of constructs (c1, c2) such that c1 ∈ Sa is an application
construct, c2 ∈ Si is a library construct, and there exists
a call from c1 to c2. We define callee the library construct
called directly from the application, i.e., c2. In the example of
Figure 3 there are two touch points: (α, β) and (λ, ψ), with
β and ψ being the callees.
Given a library in use Si and its candidate replacement Sj ,
we define the following update metrics.
Callee Stability (CS ). Let c(Si)k with k = 1, . . . , n be the
callees of Si, and c
(Sj)
k = 1 if c
(Si)
k ∈ Sj , 0 otherwise. Then
the callee stability is the number of callees of Si that exist in
Sj over the number of callees of Si:
CS =
n∑
k=1
c
(Sj)
k /|{c(Si)1 , . . . , c(Si)n }| =
n∑
k=1
c
(Sj)
k /n
If Sj contains all the callees of Si, then the callee stability
is 1, to indicate that the constructs of Si called by the
application exist also in library Sj . In case Sj does not contain
all the callees of Si, then the callee stability is smaller than 1
and reaches 0 when none of the callees of Si is present in Sj .
Development Effort (DE ). Let a(Si)k with k = 1, . . . , n
be the calls from the application to the callees of Si, and
a
(Sj)
k = 1 if a
(Si)
k 6∈ Sj , 0 otherwise. The development effort
for updating from library Si in use by the application to library
Sj is defined as the number of application calls that require a
modification due to callees of Si that do not exist in Sj .
DE =
n∑
k=1
a
(Sj)
k
Compared to the callee stability, the development effort
keeps into account the fact that each callee can be called
multiple times within an application.
In Figure 3, for instance, each callee is called only once
by α and λ respectively. However, assuming that β is called
by two application constructs in addition to α, and that it is
not contained in the new library Sj , CS = 1/2 whereas the
DE = 3. This reflects the fact that multiple calls need to
be modified as a result of a change in a single callee. As
defined, the development effort does not take into account
the complexity of each modification but rather focuses on the
number of modification required by the application as each
one comes at the cost not only of updating the code (which
could be automated to some extent) but also of testing it.
Reachable Body Stability (RBS ). The reachable body
stability is calculated in the same way as the callee stability,
but instead of callees, it considers the reachable share of a
library, i.e., the set of dynamically and/or statically reachable
library constructs. Given the total number of constructs of
Si reachable from the application, it measures the ratio of
those that are contained as-is, i.e., with identical identifier and
byte code, also in Sj . By quantifying the share of modified
reachable constructs, this metric provides the likelihood that
the behavior of the library changes from Si to Sj . In case all
reachable constructs of Si exist in Sj , then RBS = 1 and thus
there is a higher likelihood that the library change does not
break the application.
Overall Body Stability (OBS ). The overall body stability
is calculated similarly to RBS but now considers all the
constructs of Si. This metric provides the same indication as
the one above but, by considering the entire library rather than
only its reachable share, it is independent of the application-
specific usage.
The above metrics support the application developer in
estimating the effort and risks of updating a library. When
several non-vulnerable libraries exist that are newer than the
one in use, they are all candidate replacements. By quantifying
the changes to be performed on the application and the
changes that the library underwent, our update metrics allow
the developer to take an informed decision.
Note that the callee stability and development effort metrics
only apply for dependencies that are called directly from the
application, whereas the reachable and overall body stability
also apply for transitive dependencies and frameworks.
IV. EVALUATION
The implementation of our approach for Java, has been
successfully used at SAP to perform over 250000 scans of
about 500 applications since December 2016. In the following,
we illustrate how our approach works in a typical scan,
applying it to a SAP-internal web application that we adapted,
for illustrative purposes, to include vulnerable OSS. The
application allows users to upload files, such as documents
or compressed archives, through an HTML form, inspects
the file content and displays a summary to the user. It is
developed using Maven [23], and depends on popular open-
source libraries from the Apache Software Foundation, such
as Struts 2.3.24 (released on 3 May 2015), Commons FileUpload
1.3.1 (6 February 2014), POI 3.14 (6 March 2016) and HttpClient
4.5.2 (21 February 2016). Overall, the application has 12 direct
and 15 transitive compile-time dependencies.
The analysis is performed using an implementation of the
approach described previously: Sections II-B, II-D, and II-E
are implemented as goals of a Maven plugin; the collection of
traces during the dynamic analysis (Section II-C) is performed
by instrumenting all classes of both the application and all
its dependencies as described in [11]. This happens either
at runtime, when classes are loaded, or by modifying the
byte code of the application before deploying it in a runtime
environment such as Apache Tomcat.
A. Detection and Analysis
To illustrate the benefits of our approach, we go through the
analysis steps and highlight selected findings. To demonstrate
the added value of static analysis compared to [11], we per-
form it after dynamic analysis. However, our implementation
also supports changing their order (or executing only a subset
of the steps).
(1) Vulnerability Detection. The first step is to create a bill
of materials (BOM), consisting of the constructs of the appli-
cation and all its dependencies, as explained in Section II-B.
Vulnerabilities in a library are detected by intersecting the
set of constructs found in (the BOM of) that library with the
vulnerable constructs of all the vulnerabilities known to our
knowledge base. As an example, the bottom part of Figure 6
shows a table listing the vulnerable constructs for CVE-2017-
5638 (columns Type and Qualified Construct Name) together
with the respective change operation (column Change), as well
as the information that those constructs are actually present
Fig. 4: Unit tests reveal the execution of vulnerable construct
SharedStringsTable.readFrom(InputStream) in poi-ooxml
in the Java archive corresponding to struts-core:2.3.24 (column
Contained).
The vulnerability detection step reveals that our sample
application includes vulnerable code related to 25 different
vulnerabilities, affecting nine different compile-time depen-
dencies: seven are direct, while the remaining two (ognl:3.0.6
and xwork-core:2.3.243, pulled in through struts2-core:2.3.24) are
transitive.
(2) Dynamic Assessment (Unit tests). The execution
of unit tests reveals that vulnerable constructs related
to three vulnerabilities are executed, e.g., the method
URIBuilder.normalizePath(String)4, which is part of httpclient:4.5.2
and subject to vulnerability HTTPCLIENT-1803 [24]. An-
other example is shown in Figure 4: method Shared-
StringsTable.readFrom(InputStream), which is part of poi-ooxml:3.14
and subject to CVE-2017-5644, is invoked in the con-
text of unit test openSpreadsheetTest. The fact that reflec-
tion is heavily used inside the poi-ooxml method XSSFFac-
tory.createDocumentPart(Class,Class[],Object[]) (as visible from a
sequence of four invocations of newInstance, see figure) makes
it difficult for static analysis to determine the reachability of
the vulnerable method.
(3) Dynamic Assessment (Integration tests). The execution
of integration tests is done using an instrumented version of
the application deployed in a runtime container. They reveal
the execution of vulnerable code related to eight additional
vulnerabilities, all affecting struts2-core, or its dependencies
ognl and xwork-core. As an example, the last line of the
table in Figure 6 shows a vulnerable construct of CVE-2017-
3Maven dependencies are denoted using their artifact identifier followed
by, where necessary, a colon and their version. Group identifiers are omitted
for brevity.
4Where possible, Java package and class names are omitted for brevity.
Fig. 5: Combined analysis reveals the reachability of Multi-
PartRequestWrapper.buildErrorMessage(. . . ) in struts2-core
5638, FileUploadInterceptor.intercept(ActionInvocation), whose actual
execution is traced (column Traced) at the reported time. This
method is included in struts2-core 2.3.24 which is part of the
Struts2 framework and exemplifies the inversion of control
(IoC) happening when frameworks invoke application code.
(4) Static Assessment. The static analysis starting from
application constructs reveals that the constructor Multipart-
Stream(InputStream,byte[],int,ProgressNotifier), part of commons-
fileupload:1.3.1 and subject to CVE-2016-3092, is reachable from
the application. Dynamic analysis was not able to trace its
execution due to the limited test coverage.
On the other hand, static analysis starting from the ap-
plication constructs falls short in the presence of IoC. As
application methods are called by the framework, there is no
path on the call graph starting from application and reaching
framework constructs that are involved in the IoC mechanism.
(5) Combination of Static and Dynamic Assessment. The
static analysis starting from constructs traced with dynamic
analysis provides additional evidence regarding the relevance
of CVE-2017-5638 (the vulnerability that was exploited in the
Equifax breach [8]). In addition to the execution of method
FileUploadInterceptor.intercept(ActionInvocation) during step 3, the
combination of static and dynamic analysis reveals that method
MultiPartRequestWrapper.buildErrorMessage(Throwable, Object[]), in-
cluded in struts2-core 2.3.24, is reachable with two calls from
the traced method Dispatcher.wrapRequest(HttpServletRequest), as
shown in Figure 5. Its reachability is indicated with the red
paw icons in the table containing the construct changes for
CVE-2017-5638 (cf. the two right-most columns of the table in
Figure 6).
The value of combining the two analysis techniques be-
comes more evident when considering all applications scanned
with our approach: vulnerable constructs are reachable, stat-
ically or dynamically, in 131 out of 496 applications. In
particular we observed 390 pairs of applications and vulner-
abilities whose constructs were reachable. In 32 cases, the
reachability could only be determined through the combination
of techniques, which represents a 7.9% increase of evidence
that vulnerable code is potentially executable.
B. Mitigation
During the execution of dynamic analysis (steps 2 and 3)
and static analysis (steps 4 and 5), touch points and reachable
constructs are collected. They are the basis for the computation
of the update metrics for the application at hand.
Figure 7 shows that for httpclient:4.5.2, one of the direct
dependencies of the application, there are nine touch points
Fig. 6: Static analysis starting from traced methods provides further evidence that CVE-2017-5638 is relevant
between the application and the library. The application
method ArchivePrinter.httpRequest2(String), for instance, calls the
constructor HttpGet(String) (cf. first table in the figure). This
invocation was observed during dynamic analysis, and was
also found by static analysis (cf. rightmost columns in the first
table in the figure). The second table of the figure shows the
number of constructs of httpclient:4.5.2 by type. For example,
of the 608 constructors (CONS), 199 were found reachable by
static analysis, and 117 were actually executed during tests.
The table at the bottom of Figure 7 shows the update
metrics that can guide the developer in the selection of a
non-vulnerable replacement for httpclient:4.5.2. Each table row
corresponds to a release of Apache HttpClient that is not subject
to any vulnerability known to our knowledge base, hence, the
developer is advised to choose among the three versions: 4.5.3,
4.5.4 and 4.5.5. The callees of all touch points exist in all of
those versions, hence, the update to any of those would not
result in signature incompatibilities (cf. columns 3 and 4). The
RBS metric indicates that 872 out of 876 reachable constructs
of type method and constructor are also present in release 4.5.3
(870 out of 876 in 4.5.4 and 4.5.5). The OBS metric is also
relatively high for all three non-vulnerable releases, thus, the
developer would likely choose httpclient:4.5.5 in order to update
the vulnerable library.
While the update decision is relatively straightforward for
httpclient, it is more difficult for strut2-core, since there are
non-vulnerable replacements from both the 2.3 and the 2.5
branch (cf. Figure 8). Here, the RBS and OBS metrics
indicate a more significant change of constructs between the
current version struts-core:2.3.24 and the latest version of the 2.5
branch (RBS=862/887 and OBS=2781/3101) than between
the current version and the latest version of the 2.3 branch
(RBS=885/887 and OBS=3095/3101). Hence, the developer
may be more inclined to stick to the 2.3 branch, thus updating
to struts-core:2.3.34 rather than to struts2-core:2.5.16.
V. EXPERIENCE REPORT
A. From Research Prototype to Industrial-Grade Solution.
The approach presented in this paper is implemented as a
SAP-internal tool called Vulas. Initially, a research prototype
was used to run pilots with a small number of development
units, to clarify the needs of real-life development projects and
to evaluate the viability of our approach.
From the feedback gathered from the users of the prototype,
we could make two clear observations:
a) Precision: Developers feared that using yet another
tool (general static code analyzers as well as dynamic se-
curity testing tools were widely available to scan the code
of open-source dependencies used in SAP’s products) would
mean being flooded with more findings referring to potential
issues, many of which irrelevant (not exploitable) in practice.
Especially the more security-aware among developers were
reluctant to use metadata-based tools, because of their exces-
sive rate of false-positives and false-negatives. As a matter of
fact, frequent false-positives can challenge the adoption of a
tool as much as false-negatives do. This observation confirmed
the importance of our decision to strive for a reliable, precise
method to detect the actual presence of vulnerable code in a
given library.
b) Inobtrusiveness and Automation: A tool whose adop-
tion requires changes in the development practices is extremely
hard to promote. We made the choice to integrate with the
de-facto standard build processes and tools, making Vulas a
pluggable element of the automated build tool-chain that could
be enabled with minimal configuration effort. Automating
vulnerability scans has the additional benefit that issues are
Fig. 7: Touch points, reachable constructs and update metrics for httpclient:4.5.2
Fig. 8: Update metrics for struts2-core:2.3.24
detected in a more timely manner, allowing better prioritization
and effort allocation to identify and apply cost-effective fixes.
After the prototyping phase, as the demand for Vulas started
to increase, the tool underwent a major reimplementation in
order to make it more flexible and scalable, by adopting
a micro-services architecture and deploying it onto SAP’s
internal cloud infrastructure.
With the growth of the user base, we could observe that
the tool is used differently depending on the phase of the
development life-cycle.
Projects in the earliest phases of development, and partic-
ularly those that have not yet been released to customers,
are mainly concerned with identifying as early as possible
the dependency on a vulnerable library. The large majority
of projects (roughly 90%) are scanned with Vulas routinely,
as part of an automated build pipeline, in which vulnerability
detection (based purely on the analysis of the constructs of
the application and its libraries as presented in Section II-B)
is performed at each commit, whereas deeper analysis is only
run as a nightly (or weekly) job. The performance offered by
the vulnerability detection implemented in Vulas is adequate
for frequent scans, since its average execution time is about
70 seconds (static and dynamic analysis can take hours to
complete, depending on the size of the application).
We observed that in this phase, the resistance to updates
(especially, to minor releases) is quite low, and developers
tend to update their OSS dependencies in a short time-frame.
Deeper analysis of the vulnerability becomes more and more
critical the closer the project gets to the date of release to
customers, and stays so throughout the operational lifetime
of the application because new vulnerabilities impacting the
application could be discovered at any point in time after
the release. After the release date, Vulas is used mostly in
manual scans, as a program comprehension tool, to achieve a
deeper understanding of whether and how vulnerable code is
reachable in a target application, what its concrete impact is,
and what remediation options are available.
To deal also with legacy applications, built without mod-
Fig. 9: Number of dependencies in the applications analyzed.
ern tools such as Maven [23] or Gradle [25], a dedicated
command-line version of Vulas is often used.
We found that both in new and legacy applications, library
artifacts are very often renamed in an ad-hoc, often inconsis-
tent manner, and the content of one or more original libraries
might be extracted and repackaged as a single self-contained
archive. In this context, metadata is most often incomplete
or missing, which makes our code-centric approach critical.
The method implemented in Vulas, whereby vulnerable code
is identified in the (byte)code of libraries, does not suffer from
the limitations of the approaches based on metadata (such
as OWASP Dependency Check [9], which relies on Maven
artifact identifiers, file names or the content of manifest files
to work correctly).
At the time of writing, Vulas is the officially recommended
tool at SAP to scan Java projects. It is used by over 500 distinct
development projects, and its adoption has been growing at a
rate of 15 to 20 new applications per week since the beginning
of 2018. The sizes of the applications scanned as of today
are plotted in Figure 9. During these scans, we detected about
30000 pairs of vulnerabilities and libraries. More than a half of
these pairs concern libraries that are not published to Maven
central (because they have been recompiled, repackaged, or
otherwise manipulated).
Despite its success, several challenges, pertaining to either
organizational or technical aspects, remain to be addressed.
In the remainder of this section we briefly discuss the most
important ones.
B. Challenges
1) Developer Opt-in vs. Central Scans: To foster the uptake
by developers, one has to minimize the required changes of
development artifacts and processes. Plug-ins for common
build tools support this goal, and the provision of templates
for continuous integration pipelines goes as far as enabling
in-depth Vulas scans by means of boolean flags. Still, the
tool adoption ultimately depends on the developer’s initiative,
even at that degree of integration and automation. Awareness
campaigns, trainings and other organizational measures are
one means to this end, however, they require significant re-
sources in large, international and heterogeneous development
organizations. Future work aims at overcoming such issues by
running fully-automated scans at a few central elements of an
organization’s development infrastructure, e.g., its source code
or artifact repositories.
2) Decision-Support vs. Decision-Making: Vulas is essen-
tially a fact-finding tool, whose goal is to provide comprehen-
sive evidence that vulnerable code is included and reachable
in a given application. Clearly, it is cannot prove (decide)
whether vulnerable code can or cannot be exploited. However,
we occasionally observe this expectation, particularly when
library updates are difficult and expensive. Again, trainings
and security-awareness campaigns are essential to ensure that
developers internalize that they are responsible for drawing
the final conclusion in regards to the exploitability of each
vulnerability, especially before sticking to a vulnerable open-
source version. Also, while such conclusions and the decision
to upgrade (or not) a library have to be documented, we
decided to keep this functionality out of the scope of Vulas
and to stick to its fact-finding mission.
3) Vulnerability Knowledge-Base: The creation and main-
tenance of a comprehensive vulnerability database is key for
our approach. However, the required vulnerability informa-
tion is scattered across many different sources, e.g., public
vulnerability databases, issue trackers and security advisories
of individual projects, or source code repositories. Moreover,
as discussed in [11], [26], different sources like the National
Vulnerability Database and code repositories are difficult to in-
tegrate using the existing data. To evaluate the completeness of
the our current knowledge base we conducted an internal study
of the vulnerability dataset, which concluded that it covers
90% of all NVD vulnerabilities reported for Java open-source
projects. At the time of writing, we are exploring the use of
machine-learning methods to automate the identification of fix
commits and to ease the maintenance of a rich knowledge base
where vulnerabilities are linked to the corresponding source
code changes. The maintenance of such a detailed knowledge
base, which is done manually as of today, would greatly benefit
from a coordinated approach to vulnerability disclosure and
patch release across the open-source community, and through
the governance exercised by established institutions, such as
the Apache Software Foundation.
4) Shallow vs. Deep Updates: The metrics of Section III
support the update to non-vulnerable library versions. In
the case of transitive dependencies, however, developers are
required to interfere with the transparency and automation
of the dependency resolution mechanism. In fact, one would
need to add the updated non-vulnerable version of the library
as a direct dependency, thereby taking the risk of future
incompatibilities. Therefore, the mitigation strategy could be
optimized to recommend the update of the library that is
“nearest” to the application. As an example, to mitigate the
vulnerable library S3 of Figure 3, a newer version of S1 can
be recommended if it pulls in a fixed version of S3.
5) Problematic Types of Vulnerabilities: By identifying a
vulnerable dependency through the presence of vulnerable
code, our approach is robust against false-positives and false-
negatives, as typical for solutions based on the mapping of
library and vulnerability metadata. As a drawback, the fraction
of vulnerabilities whose fix does not involve any code change,
e.g., those that are fixed by modifying a default configuration,
cannot be covered by our code-centric approach described
in Section II-A. Nevertheless, Vulas is able to cover such
cases, which are relatively rare compared to code-related
vulnerabilities, by flagging entire libraries as affected.
By assessing the exploitability of a vulnerability in terms
of potential or actual code execution, our approach provides
evidence about the application-specific usage of vulnerable
code. However, this approach does not work with vulnera-
bilities that are due to the deserialization of untrusted data,
where the mere presence of so-called deserialization gadgets
in the application classpath can cause the application to be
vulnerable (regardless of whether they can be reached during
normal program execution). Attackers exploit the behavior
of the Java serialization mechanism, which creates objects
(through deserialization) as long as the definition of the
respective class is known, regardless of whether the application
actively uses it or not.
6) Shortcomings of Name-based Construct Identification:
While the approach relies on the generic concept of con-
struct identifiers, Vulas uses Java fully-qualified names in its
implementation. This implementation choice supports other
programming languages as long as they have a comparable
naming scheme, and its development community follows con-
sistent naming conventions (that is, construct names can be
assumed to be globally unique, as in Java). However, this
property is not satisfied for certain languages, hence, the
construct identification cannot be done just by using their
fully-qualified names, but must consider other information,
such as their bodies.
VI. RELATED WORK
There exist several free [9] and commercial tools [10], [27],
[28], [29] for detecting vulnerabilities in OSS components.
In [11] we showed that our approach outperforms state-of-the-
art tools with respect to vulnerability detection. Though [29]
claims to perform static analysis to eliminate false positives,
there is no public description of their approach available.
OWASP Dependency Check [9] is used in [30] to create
a vulnerability alert service and to perform an empirical
investigation about the usage of vulnerable components in
proprietary software. The results showed that 54 out of 75
of the projects analyzed have at least one vulnerable library.
However the results had to be manually reviewed, as the
matching of vulnerabilities to libraries showed low precision.
Alqahtani et al. proposed an ontology-based approach to
establish a link between vulnerability databases and software
repositories [26]. The mapping resulting from their approach
yields a precision that is 5% lower than OWASP Dependency
Check. All these approaches and tools differ from ours in that
they focus on vulnerability detection based on metadata, and
do not provide application-specific reachability assessment nor
mitigation proposals.
Our previous work [11] already goes beyond the detection
of a vulnerability by performing reachability analysis: we
used dynamic analysis to establish whether vulnerable code is
actually executed. In this work, we extend [11] including also
static analysis and providing a novel combination of static and
dynamic analysis. To the best of our knowledge none of the
existing works and tools combines static and dynamic analysis,
nor provides application-specific mitigation proposals.
The screening test approach devised by Dashevskyi et
al. [31] represents a scalable solution to the difficult problem of
determining, at the time when a new vulnerability is disclosed
for a given OSS component, which other previous versions are
also affected by the same vulnerability. We tackle the same
problem by comparing ASTs of the constructs involved in
the vulnerability across the different versions of the affected
component; however, due to space constraints, the details of
our method are not covered in this paper.
The empirical study conducted by Kula et al. on library
migrations of 4600 GitHub projects showed that 81.5% of
them do not update their direct library dependencies, not even
when they are affected by publicly known vulnerabilities [32].
In particular, that study highlights the lack of awareness about
security vulnerabilities. Considering 147 Apache software
projects, [33] studied the evolution of dependencies and found
that applications tend to update their dependencies to newer
releases containing substantial changes. Tools based on reward
or incentives to trigger the update of out-of-date dependencies
exist (e.g., [34], [35]), however as shown in [36], project
developers are mostly concerned about breaking changes and
mechanisms are needed to provide–next to transparency–a
motivation for the update and confidence measures to estimate
the risk of performing the update. By automatically detecting
vulnerabilities, providing evidence about the reachability of
the vulnerable code, and supporting mitigation via update
metrics, our work addresses the need of motivating updates
and estimating effort and risk.
In [37] four metrics to measure the stability of libraries
through time are proposed. In particular it considers the
removal of units (constructs in our context), the amount of
change in existing constructs, the ratio of change in new and
old constructs, and the percentage of new constructs. Similar
to our work, the metrics are meant to be representative for
the amount of work required to update a certain library and
thus they also consider usages of library methods in other
projects. However the main focus of [37] is the library, and
the metrics are used to measure its stability over time given
a set of projects. Though some of their metrics ingredients
can also be considered in our work, the metrics we propose
are about the application-specific library usage. Moreover, our
metrics benefit of our in-depth analysis of the application (e.g.,
some usages of the libraries that can only be observed with a
combination of static and dynamic analysis).
Raemaekers et al. studied breaking changes in library re-
leases over seven years and showed that they occur with the
same frequency in major and minor releases [38]. This shows
that the rules of semantic versioning, according to which
breaking changes are only allowed in major releases, are not
followed in practice. It also shows that top three most frequent
breaking changes involve a deletion of methods, classes, fields,
respectively. This result reinforces our belief that our update
metrics based on measuring the removal of program constructs
provides a critical information.
Mileva et al. studied the usage of different library versions
and provided a tool to suggest which one to use based on
the choice of the majority of similar users [39]. Our work
differs from theirs, in that we provide quantitative measures
to support the user in selecting a non-vulnerable library.
Existing works on library migration [40], [41], [42] are
complementary to our approach in that they support developers
in evolving their code to adapt to new libraries or library
versions. [40] proposes a tool that keeps track of API popu-
larity and migration of major frameworks/libraries, amounting
to 650 Github projects resulting in 320000 APIs at the time of
publication. [41] describes tools able to recommend replace-
ments for framework methods accessed by a client program
and deleted over time. [42] presents a tool able to recommend
complex adaptations learned from already migrated clients or
the library itself.
VII. CONCLUSION
The unique contribution of this paper is the use of static
analysis and its combination with dynamic analysis to support
the application-specific assessment and mitigation of open-
source vulnerabilities. This approach further advances the
code-centric detection and dynamic analysis of vulnerable
dependencies we originally proposed in [11].
The accuracy and application-specific nature of our method
improves over state-of-the-art approaches, which commonly
depend on metadata. Vulas, the implementation of our ap-
proach for Java, was chosen by SAP among several candi-
dates as the recommended OSS vulnerability scanner. Since
December 2016, it has been used for over 250000 scans of
about 500 applications, which demonstrates the viability and
scalability of the approach.
The variety of programming languages used in today’s soft-
ware systems pushes us to extend Vulas to support languages
other than Java. However, fully-qualified names can be inad-
equate to uniquely identify the relevant program constructs in
certain languages, so we are considering the use of information
extracted from the construct bodies.
Finally, the problem of systematically linking open-source
vulnerability information to the corresponding source code
changes (the fix) remains open. Maintaining a comprehensive
knowledge base of rich, detailed vulnerability data is critical to
all vulnerability management approaches and requires consid-
erable effort. While this effort could be substantially reduced
creating specialized tools, we strongly believe that the mainte-
nance of this knowledge base should become an industry-wide,
coordinated effort, whose outcome would benefit the whole
software industry.
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